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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
 
1. The SARS Incident in Singapore – An Unconventional War 
Scenario 
Between February 20 to 25 2003, three Singaporean women traveled to 
Hong Kong and contacted a mysterious pneumonia-like fever which was later 
diagnosed as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).  Around the same 
time, the rumors of the spread of a similar disease had also been received from 
Southern China.  Given the nature of the virus, the Singapore government 
concluded that they have a highly infectious disease outbreak at hand and 
recommended that the patients be isolated [Chua Mui Hoong, 2004].  It was the 
correct thing to do, but by the time this action was taken, it was too late.  The 
virus began to spread rapidly and several others had already been infected with 
SARS.  The SARS incident in Singapore not only affected the health community 
but also had social psychological and economical fallouts. 
Little was known about this new disease at that time.  Unknowns included 
the cause of the disease, the symptoms a SARS patient, how the disease is 
transmitted and the incubation period before a SARS patient will show signs of 
infection.  These unknown created fear within the general public and health 
workers.  Stopgap measures were being developed as pieces of new information 
were discovered. 
Soon the battle was no longer confined to just another infectious disease 
incident.  Among other factors, lack of knowledge about the virus, metropolitan 
nature of Singapore and Singapore’s position as one of the global transportation 
hub soon drew other sectors of the nation into this incident.  The interplay 
between various aspects of the incident and constant bombardment of discovery 
of new facts was unprecedented.  In many respects, it was like fighting an 
unconventional war where the enemy is elusive, and the battle is raging on within 
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populated areas where civil-military operations had to be managed and 
‘collateral’ damages minimized. 
The pressure was reduced after three grueling months of battling with the 
disease when WHO took Singapore off the SARS list.  Removal from SARS 
watch list relieved pressure off the economic, travel and social-psychological 
front.  However, Singapore continued to enhance her defenses against the virus 
as no one can could tell when the enemy will strike again. 
 
2. Fight against SARS 
During the initial unsuspecting stage, medical professionals in Singapore 
were confident that SARS could be easily contained.  All indicators pointed to a 
standard infectious disease control situation.  Government reassured the public 
that there was no cause for alarm.  There were little warnings as to the looming 
crisis which was about to occur. 
Within a short span of 2 weeks, the situation in Singapore deteriorated 
rapidly. The media reports of the unknown virus and seepage of the virus from 
Tan Tock Seng Hospital (TTSH) to Singapore General Hospital (SGH) generated 
widespread fear and anxiety.  The public was seized by fear, travelers shunned 
Singapore and the nation was slowing grinding to a halt. 
Given the seriousness of the situation, the government decided to tackle it 
on a war footing.  With the declaration of war, full machinery of the government 
and quasi-government agencies swung into action.  The spread of the virus was 
to be halted, public fear be allayed and world’s confidence in Singapore be 
restored. 
To achieve these, Singapore initiated several rather strict measures.  
These included home quarantine orders for anyone who came in contact with 
patients suspected to be infected with SARS, strict border control to prevent the 
export of possible SARS cases to other countries and eliminate further 
introduction of SARS cases into Singapore, effective contact tracing system to 
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determine who came in contact with SARS infected patient and the designation 
of dedicated SARS hospital to provide the focal point in the battle plan. 
These measures were essential and effective in controlling the spread of 
the disease.  The progress instilled public confidence and the trust in the 
government.  With this confidence, people became comfortable to move out of 
the house and lead their life normally. 
Most of these measures pioneered by Singapore were rapidly adopted by 
many other countries or cities to fight SARS.  But no countries executed these 
measures as well as Singapore did, as noted by WHO observers Dr David 
Heymann, Dr Mansoor and Dr Lambert during their separate observation 
missions to Singapore during the crisis – “whatever Singapore did, it did it faster 
and more thoroughly”. 
However, questions still loom: How did Singapore execute all the new 
control measures with such effectiveness and efficiency?  How the SARS fighting 
machinery was able to adapt itself to the changing scenario rapidly?  What 
helped the formulation of these pioneering control measures? 
The overall success was attributed to effective communication between 
the government and the people, strong leadership, people’s cooperation and 
inspired healthcare workers.  Several studies, analysis and interviews had also 
been conducted focusing on information management, public communication, 
medical readiness and medical research. 
As we probe deeper into Singapore’s fight against SARS, we discover that 
at the heart of the fight was much about information.  It involved knowing what 
information is important; where and how to get it.  It was also very much about 
how the various agencies evolving themselves around the collection, processing, 
analysis and use of information.  It was also about how information is shared with 
the public. 
Beside exploitation of information, Singapore’s fight against the SARS 
disease also exemplified Network Centric Warfare (NCW) concepts in many 
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aspects.  NCW has been discussed predominately within military context.  
Nonetheless, several key NCW concepts were present in the fight and the 
episode serves as an excellent case study of NCW being employed in a non-
military setting.  
 
B. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE AND SARS 
 
1. Network Centric Warfare Framework in a Non-Military Setting 
So far much of the discussion of NCW has been focused in the military 
context.  The impetus for NCW has been to adapt conventional armed forces to 
be in line with the new global era and information age.  The primary aim is to 
increase combat effectiveness of forces in traditional missions and to counter 
new threats where traditional approaches may not effective. 
Literature search reveals that there are multiple definitions to NCW.  In 
[Alberts, Garskta, Stein 2000], NCW is defined as “an information superiority-
enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by 
networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared 
awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater 
lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self synchronization.  In 
essence, NCW translates information superiority into combat power by effectively 
linking knowledgeable entities in the battlespace.” 
Key NCW concepts include 
- Changes in the organizations and processes to improve their efficiency 
and effectiveness. 
- Networking people through the use of information technologies to 
enable virtual integration, information sharing, improve sensing and 
response, enable collaboration and synchronization. 
- Making nodes and people network ready, so that they are more 
effective in collaboration and sense making. 
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NCW principles and concepts can be adapted or applied in non-military 
setting.  Corporations are re-structuring themselves and their processes to 
improve information flow and decision-making.  Government agencies are linking 
up, enhancing information exchanges and reaching out to citizen to provide 
better services and governance. 
Adoption of NCW concepts can be seen in the fight against SARS in 
Singapore.  The tempo, uncertainty, and unconventional nature of the crisis 
make it an unusual opportunity to validate NCW concepts being employed in 
unconventional scenario. 
 
2. Fight against SARS and Network Centric Warfare 
The SARS crisis started in Singapore seemingly as a standard infectious 
disease containment problem.  Singapore has been well prepared for such 
incidents involving infectious diseases.  Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 
were developed and refined over the years for incidents such as the polio 
outbreak in the 1958 and the Nipah virus incident in Malaysia in 1999 with 
isolated cases in Singapore.  However, what differentiated SARS from other 
contagious diseases was that very little was known about this new disease.  This 
negated the effectiveness of the various established SOPs.  The medical 
community did not know what it was that they are trying to contain. 
The ignorance created fear, anxiety and the spillage to other aspects of 
the nation increased the complexity of problem dramatically.  The disease had 
effectively opened up several other battlefronts in its campaign.  Ad hoc 
measures were implemented with limited information and danger of repercussion 
to other aspects.  The measures challenged the traditional governmental 
hierarchy and stove-piped structure.  Not only inter-ministries interactions were 
required, they were expected to happen in near real time as the situation 
changed and new findings on the virus are found. 
To affect the control measures effectively, ad hoc structures and 
processes which spanned agencies were established.  Furthermore, these ad 
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hoc structures, processes and people had to constantly adapt as the situation 
evolved and new information were received.  A great amount of agility was 
featured during the fight. 
Media coverage and the Internet increased the tempo and complexity of 
the episode.  New occurrences, infectious count, travel warnings and advisories 
were broadcast in near real time.  Interpretation and speculation raged on in the 
cyber world and in “coffee shop”1.  Government actions needed to be responsive 
to maintain the confidence and trust of the people.  Failing which, public 
speculation, suspicion and fear could have spiraled out of control. 
Throughout the fight, information technologies were employed extensively.  
Organizational barriers were torn down and inter-agency processes established 
whenever required.  Information flowed freely; decisions were made collectively 
which resulted in all agencies not only understanding the decisions but also the 
intent and rationale behind those decisions.  This enabled each agency to 
senses, respond and seek out more relevant information own their own; 
achieving a certain degree of synchronization.  Decision makers formed coherent 
pictures out of a chaotic and unfamiliar situation and navigated from the unknown 
to knowable. 
We detected several aspects of NCW being employed in the fight against 
SARS.  We are also sure that the employment of NCW concepts was not a 
conscious guiding principle in the fight against SARS.  It seems that some 
unspoken cultural norm amongst the various agencies, coupled with the common 
objective of bringing this fight to an end as quickly as possible, was sufficient for 
inter-agency processes to developed; information to flow freely across agencies; 
decision makers and frontline workers alike recognized the importance of timely 
and accurate information.  This subconscious cultural norm is perhaps also partly 
due to the affluence of Singapore whereby information and technology is a 
nature aspect of the society.  However, the focus of this thesis is not what 
resulted in NCW being featured in SARS.  The questions we will attempt to 
                                            
1 Common local dinning place in Singapore 
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answer are: How much do employment of these concepts contributed to the 
success of Singapore in combating the SARS disease?  What can we learn from 
this episode?  How can we better prepare ourselves for such unconventional, 
unknown and asymmetric scenarios? 
To answer these questions, this thesis analyzes significant events 
throughout the fight against SARS in Singapore, decisions and actions taken 
during those events.  From the analysis, we will draw out lessons from this 
episode.  We will then attempt to generalize these lessons learnt to be applicable 
in similar situations in Singapore and elsewhere.  We will also propose a 
technical architecture to facilitate the exchange and exploitation of information, 
and creation of ad hoc structures and processes which are the critical success 
factors in dealing with unconventional crisis such as SARS. 
 
C. NCW LESSONS FROM SARS 
 
As observed by WHO, what differentiated Singapore from other SARS 
affected countries were the speed and thoroughness in which the various control 
measures were executed.  It is also recognized that despite the lack of 
knowledge about the new virus and the rapid changing environment, Singapore 
was able to identify key problem areas and develop new and effective measures 
faster and better than other countries.  Analyzing the various key events, and 
decisions which took place, we determined the primary factor was that Singapore 
exploited information better than others.  Singapore was able to ensure timely 
distribution of information for collaboration, decision-making, execution and 
feedback.  The other factor was the flexibility and agility in which Singapore 
organized itself to tackle the various situations.  These two factors manifested in 





1. Information Sharing 
The Singapore government agencies were able to identify quickly what 
information was needed and its sources.  They were able to develop processes, 
either manual or computerized, to ensure the timely collection and distribution of 
information.  For example, the contact-tracing center was linked to civilian 
telephone directory services, National Registration Office, Ministry of Manpower 
database.  This increased the efficiency of the contact tracing.  The Home 
Quarantine Order (HQO) information was pushed to border control on a timely 
basis to prevent people served with HQO from leaving the countries. 
 
2. Ad Hoc and Flexible Organizational Structure 
Most of the control measures implemented required numerous 
organization and agencies to work in synchronization.  These included the 
execution of Home Quarantine Orders, creation of a “SARS free corridor”, 
perception management and labor market management.  The containment of a 
community outbreak in the Pasir Panjang Wholesale Centre (PPWC)2 proved to 
be a major challenge in the entire SARS episode.  Multiple agencies were pulled 
together to contain the outbreak and its various other fallouts. 
These demonstrated the need and effectiveness of ad hoc structure 
needed to deal with unknown situations.  Agility of these ad hoc structures to 
evolve as situations changed was another strength demonstrated by Singapore.  
It was able to bring different agencies and expertise together, enabling 
collaboration and enhancing the decision making process. 
 
3. Inter-Agency Processes 
Beside the enhanced collaborations and decision-makings, Singapore 
government agencies also demonstrated the ability to implement and execute  
                                             
2 The primary vegetable and fruits produce whole sale centre in Singapore.  It imports 80% of 
Singapore’s daily fresh produces consumption needs. 
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complex measures and activities involving multi-agencies.  This ability was key to 
the speed, thoroughness and effectiveness demonstrated. 
However, some gaps and lapses in these inter-agency processes also 
resulted in the spreading of SARS into SGH, and PPWC.  We identified that this 
is one of the areas in which technology can help to enhance the execution of 
inter-agency processes. 
 
4. Mobility and Agility 
Information was available for the ground executors.  However, the means 
used were rudimentary such as cellular (or hand) phones and communication 
sets such as walkie-talkies.  While this did not result in any significant setbacks in 
the fight, the efficiency of the ground executors could have been improved with 
enhanced information services.  These ground executors could have acted as 
sensors and provided timely feedback. 
 
5. Employment of Technology 
During the early stage of the crisis, most of the activities were human 
intensive.  This had resulted in gaps and mistakes.  Technologies, especially 
information technologies were introduced when the situation spiraled into a crisis.  
Due to limited time, technologies were employed only in contact tracing, hospital 
movement and border control.  However, these were sufficient to demonstrate 
the increased in effectiveness brought about by technology. 
 
D. CLASSES OF ACTORS AND THEIR INFORMATION NEEDS FOR 
DEALING WITH UNFAMILIAR CRISIS 
 
1. Classes of Actors 
Using Singapore’s SARS incident as a case study, we identified 4 main 
classes of actors.  We assessed that classes of actors dealing with unfamiliar 
crisis can be generalized to the following:  
10 
 




a. Strategic Decision Makers 
Strategic decision makers perceive the problem, formulate 
alternatives and decide the courses of action.  In many cases, they make 
decisions with incomplete information, make judgments, and decide on hunches 
or rational choices with constraints.  Their information needs range from 
represented data in computers systems to un-captured information such as 
conversation, sentiments, media broadcast and tacit wisdom.  They rely heavily 
on what we call the abstract class of information and to a large extend executive 
information. 
 
b. Operations Coordinator 
Operations coordinator translates decisions into action plans.  To 
do that, they need to understand the intent of the decisions and the context in 
which the decisions were made.  They will chart out the activities required, 
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sequence and synchronizes activities across functional groups.  They need to 
monitor the progress and the trends of the environment and make adjustments if 
necessary.  Their information needs are primarily feedbacks, trends, statistics 
and reports. 
 
c. Mobile Executor 
Mobile executors execute tasks and orders and are in direct contact 
with events happening on the ground.  Their primary information needs are highly 
specific and are related to their task and their immediate operating environment.  
Though their effectiveness may be enhanced with more information, beyond a 
point, the increase is marginal and there is a possibility of information overload.  
Mobile executors are excellent sensors as they are directly in contact with the 
situation in real time. 
 
d. Content Managers 
While not directly involved in actions, the content managers’ role is 
perhaps the most critical.  They are required to understand the essences of 
decisions and processes and determine the information sources needed to 
support these.  They need to ensure that the information sources are compatible 
at various levels so that the information will not be used out of context.  Content 
managers also need to ensure the packaging and the presentation of information 
helps the entire operations.  They are to determine if there are uncertainties 
within the information provided and explain how the uncertainties may affect 
decisions and actions. 
 
2. Information Needs 
Depending on their roles, actors within a crisis need different mix of 




a. Abstract Information 
Information in this class is mostly tacit in nature.  This includes 
cognitive information such as wisdom, imagination, experience, metaphor or 
complex cause-effect relationship. Given the short observation duration of crisis 
and the interplay of multiple factors, it is not immediately obvious the relationship 
between information entities.  The cause-effect relationship of actions and 
observed environment also cannot be established with certainty within the short 
observation duration. 
It is generally difficult to map information within this class.  This is 
especially so given the time constraints and the differences in the interplay of 
factors in each situation. 
 
b. Executive Information 
Executive information is higher level interpretation of specific 
information.  This includes trends, relationships and deviations of groups of 
specific information.  These analyses can further be used to develop models and 
hypotheses of the situation.  Assumptions and estimates can be made with 
varying degree of uncertainty to fill in the information gaps.  Optimization with 
constraints, modeling and simulation can be carried to generate possible courses 
of action. 
While executive information may be complex in form or 
presentation, it can be represented and represent the knowable.  Information in 
this class are used for decision making in complex but mostly known situations. 
 
c. Specific Information 
Information in this class is necessary for the completion of a task 
such as deliver item X to person Y in location Z by time H or in the analysis of 
trends such as number of people with symptom in this area.  This information 
exhibits high degree of certainty and can be represented, stored, manipulated, 
queried and transmitted. 
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E. TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE TO SUPPORT NETWORK CENTRIC 
OPERATIONS IN UNCONVENTIONAL CRISIS 
 
1. Cardinal Requirement and Support Technology 
 Using Singapore’s SARS incident as a case study, we determined the 
various NCW concepts that were employed and the improvement in operational 
efficiency achieved.  We also identified limitations of executing newly established 
inter-agency processes manually and the data interoperability issues associated 
in briefing ad hoc people and systems together.  From the case study, we 
determined that appropriate application of information technology will 
complement the application of NCW concepts.  The main challenge is the 
integration of the various technologies into a large-scale system.  From the 
lessons  learnt  from  SARS,  the  roles  of  various  classes  of  actors  and  their 
information needs, we identified the following cardinal requirement, support 
technology and the architecture for this system: 
 
a. Data Interoperability 
The system aims to allow high degree of information flow between 
agencies.  The primary challenge is information interoperability.  This is 
especially so when attempting to link systems across different agencies and 
vintages.  The system should allow retrieval, query, correlation and fusion of data 
across different data sources, operating on different platforms and query 
methods.  Besides the data connectivity, the meaning and context of information 
must be preserved with minimal uncertainty. 
Content managers will establish the linkages between information 
sources based on the operational needs.  With the help of middleware, content 
managers will establish the data conversion matrix between data source.  Based 
on the matrix, the middleware will support the exchange and manipulations of 
information  from  different  sources  and  format.   In  this  way, ad hoc and rapid  
 
14 
inter-connecting of data sources can be achieved and a coherent situation 
picture can be presented to users or applications. 
An intelligence data broker layer will facilitate the translation of 
information while preserving the meaning and context.  Using translation rules, a 
data broker layer will support the integration of the data sources at the same 
time, preserving the meaning of information when it is being accessed by another 
agency.  If there are to be losses in accuracy or uncertainty as a result of the 
translation, these need to be explained so that decisions can be made with these 
taken into consideration. 
For information which cannot be translated automatically via data 
broker, content managers will perform manual conversion/translation.  He will be 
provided with the necessary tools to perform these tasks efficiently. 
 
b. Support for Ad Hoc Structure 
One of the key success factors in Singapore’s SARS incident was 
the ability to form ad hoc organizational structure and implement processes 
which span agencies.    One of the primary focuses of the proposed system is to 
enhance the effectiveness of collaboration and the ability to execute ad hoc 
processes which are created as a result of the collaborations.  The formation of 
ad hoc structure entails bringing people from different domains of expertise 
together.  The most effective form of collaboration is still to have face-face 
meeting where beside verbal communication, non-verbal communication such as 
gestures and cues enhances the collaboration process.  Technologies may be 
employed if such face-to-face meetings are not possible.  However, technology 
can also be employed to enhance the effectiveness of individuals collaborating.  
Individuals can be provided with higher quality information, background 
information of others in the collaborations to better understand each other’s point 
of view, tools to query rich source of information during the collaboration process. 
The outcomes of such collaborations are actions plans or new 
processes.  Humans, being habitual, are prone to mistakes when new processes 
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are being introduced.  The proposal system can enhance the execution of new 
processes with automated inter-agency processes to complement the manual 
processes. 
 
c. Support for Mobility 
In dealing with unconventional situation, ground executors need to 
be mobile so as to react to situation on the ground.  They should also be 
provided enhance information services which can improve their effectiveness.  
Information services such as mapping service, 2nd level information services, 
role-based information service, and location based information service. 
 
F. THESIS OUTLINE 
 
The thesis takes a retrospective study of the SARS incident in Singapore.  
It identifies critical factors in Singapore fight to contain the SARS outbreak and 
propose a technical to support network centric operations in dealing with such 
unconventional crisis.  The architecture amalgamates the various information 
technologies and demonstrates how the various sub-modules can work together 
to tackle unconventional crisis. 
In Chapter II, NCW framework and concepts will be presented.  Various 
armed forces have different definitions and views when it comes to NCW.  
Instead of presenting various concepts, we will base our thesis primarily on the 
NCW works of US Department of Defense (DoD), Office of Transformation. 
In Chapter III, NCW framework, concepts and information technologies 
employed within the fight against SARS will be identified.  The aim is to 
determine how these helped in the episode. 
In Chapter IV, we will use this as the case study to identify information 
needs and flow required in unconventional crisis environment.  In Chapter V, we  
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will propose a technical architecture to maximize the leverage on information to 
effectively and efficiently combat asymmetric biological threats such as SARS. 
We will conclude the thesis with recommendations and possible areas for 
further studies or research. 
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II. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
A. IMPETUS FOR NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
 
There are different views and definitions as to what network centric 
warfare is.  Despite these differences, there is a common underlying essence.  
Information and how organizations uses information is the underlying belief that 
NCW will fundamentally change the way military operates.  It is the military 
version of e-commence.  The main differences are the interpretations of what are 
the organizational behavior and changes, and how information is to be exploited.  
Debates are on issues such as: Should we revolve information around 
organizational goals and processes or revolve organization around information, 
and what type of information yields the maximum returns in terms of 
effectiveness or improvement in efficiency.  To understand the essence of NCW, 
it is perhaps important to understand the background and impetus that lead to 
this impending revolution in military operations. 
The impetus can be broadly classified into 2 areas although factors within 
each group will inevitably interlink with each other in a lesser way. 
 
1. Emerging Challenges 
 
a. Unpredictable Global Politics 
The global politics is undergoing reconfiguration.  At the global 
level, the international system is perplexed by the end of cold war, China’s 
emergence as a global power competing for influence, expanding European 
Union, and Japan’s fluttering economy and influence in the Asia region.  At 
regional levels, countries are realigning with supranational organizations3 and 
forming regional political and economical blocs.  Such reconfiguration is 
                                            
3 Such as United Nations, World Trade Organizations 
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proceeding precariously, stabilized only by lack of powerful rouge state or player 
and increased trade interdependence of states. 
 
b. Terrorist and Insurgence Threats 
While the threat of global or large scale, state vs state war has 
reduced, threats of conflicts at lower level have increased.  Sep 11 2001 attack, 
Bali bombing and subsequent events throughout the world illustrate the new form 
of threats faced by the world.  Terrorist and insurgence groups formed and 
emerged, and threaten to destabilize the international and way of life of others.  
As these groups are mostly non-formal political entities, they do not conform to 
established rules or norms.  They employ asymmetric and unconventional 
tactics, mostly have low respect for humane warfare and do not observe 
established international rules of engagement. 
These non-state actors are primarily driven by shared faith and 
beliefs.  Through these faith and belief, they achieved a high level of self-
formation and synchronization, and with reduced organizational burden and 
delectability.  They blend themselves amongst people both in the physical and 
cyber space.  Peacetime structuring, preparation and training to engage these 
elusive enemies are difficult. 
  
2. Changing Environment 
The other primary impetus is the changing environment.  This 
environmental change is brought about as we move into the information age 
which is fundamentally driven by information technology.  “emerging information 
technology are fundamentally reshaping the global environment in ways 
unthinkable in the past”. [John & David, 2004].  At the same time, the 
environment also fuels advances in information technology in return.  The 




a. Advances in IT Capability 
Computational power, storage capacity and speed of information 
transmission have seen phenomenal growth within the last few decades.  
Computational power has been conforming to Moore’s Law by doubling every 18 
months.  Hard disk capacity has even outperformed Moore’s prediction and 
memory management methods such as caching boost the overall performance of 
a memory system.  Advances in chip manufacturing also increased the speed of 
communication and network devices. 
 
Figure 2.   Moore’s Law [www.intel.com/research/silicon/mooreslaw.htm, 2004] 
 
Together with other technologies such as TCP/IP, web browser, 
point and click interface, ushered in the information age.  All these resulted in 






b. Connectivity, Portability and Mobility 
Not only are we able to handle more information faster, the Internet, media 
coverage, mobile devices and services also increased our connectivity to people 
and information sources.  Using Metcalfe’s law, the “utility” or “value” of network 
increases proportionally to the square of the number of nodes: 
( )2  NodesofNumberValue ∝  
However, David Reed pointed out the value of networks is based 
not only its point-point connection ability, but its group-forming ability.  Based on 
that, the value of network increases proportionally to 2 raised to the power of 
number of nodes: 
)  (2 NodesofNumberValue ∝  
 [www.reed.com/Papers/GFN/readslaw.html - 9 Nov 2004] 
These increased value and the ability to share information 
transcends international boundaries and governmental organization.  This 
facilitated the formation of virtual communities, interest groups and supranational 
organizations and challenges traditional governance.  They are also being 




Globalization is characterized by increased connectivity between 
societies due to telecommunication, Internet, transportation, information flow and 
trans-cultural exchanges.  Globalization brings like-minded people together in 
various ways, increased international trade, cultural exchanges and increases 
cultural diversity. 
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On the other hand, globalization also increases the potential for 
clashes between beliefs, religion and cultures.  Countries dependence on global 
trade also increases their exposure and risk to events in other parts of the world. 
 
B. ARMED FORCES RESPONSE TO THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 
 
Each nation has their perspectives as to how the changing global political 
landscape, raising threat and changing environment have on their countries.  
They are influenced strongly by regional factors and have prioritized the impact 
of these trends.  Despite these differences, all share the common conclusion that 
the future is dynamic, filled with uncertainties and they face emerging threats of 
unconventional nature.  In response, respective armed forces are reviewing their 
outlook and missions capabilities against the changing environment. 
Most developed armed forces are embracing the concept of network 
centricity in their force structure and capability buildup.  The belief is that network 
centricity will provide them the capability to adapt and evolve to meet new 
challenges, leverage on information and information technology to increase their 
combat effectiveness. 
Though all agree that networks and information are common 
denominators, politics, existing organizational structure, budget and other factors 
influence respective armed forces’ views of what network centricity means to 
them.  Below are some definitions and expressions of what NCW means to some 
of the leading Armed forces. 
 
The ability to gather knowledge; to share it in a common and 
comprehensible form with our partners; to assess and refine it to 
turn into knowledge; to pass it to the people who need it in an 
edited, focused form; and to do it in a timescale necessary to 
enable relevant decisions to be made in the most economic and 
efficient manner 
  UK DCDS (EC) 8 Nov 01 on Network Enabled Capabilities 
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Network-centricity will help us to link national, ADF and coalition 
sensor, engagement systems and decision-makers into an effective 
and responsive whole.  At its core, NCW seeks to provide the future 
force with the ability to generate tempo, precision and combat 
power through shared situational awareness, clear procedures, and 
the information connectivity needed to synchronise our actions to 
meet the commanders’ intent.  NCW will require an approach that 
integrates our existing processes and systems with new technology 
and doctrine in the most effective and efficient way. 
  Senator Hon Robert Hill, Australian Minister for Defence 
address to ADF NCW conference May 2003 
 
Network Based Defence, NBD, is the concept for developing a new 
kind of defence through transforming today’s force structure into a 
defence based on flexible, rapid and controlled engagement 
capabilities.  Networking the commanders and warfighters enables 
smarter use of resources at the right time and in the right place.  
NBD also means a capability to adapt continuously to changing 
threats, new tasks and advances in technology 
       Swedish Armed Forces 
 
C. TENETS OF NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, we will examine the US concept of network 
centric operations proposed in Network Centric Warfare [Alberts, Garstka & Stein 
1998].  This publication describes NCW is as follows: 
 NCW is about human and organizational behavior.  NCW is based 
on adopting a new way of thinking – network-centric thinking – and 
applying it to military operations.  NCW focuses on the combat 
power that can be generated from the effective linking or network of 
the warfighting enterprise.  It is characterized by the ability of 
geographically dispersed forces (consisting of entities) to create a 
high level of shared battlespace awareness that can be exploited 
via self-synchronization and other network-centric operations to 
achieve commanders intent. 
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In DoD’s Network Centric Warfare report to Congress in 2001, 4 tenets of 
NCW are as follows: 
1. Networked force improves information sharing.   
2. Information sharing enhances the quality of information and shared 
situational awareness.   
3. Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self 
synchronization and enhances sustainability and speed of 
command.   
4. These in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.  
The primary aim of these tenets is to increase the richness and power of 
information, which translates into military capabilities.  Information need not flow 
in hierarchical fashion, instead it can be pulled from sources, push to relevant 
uses where it can increase the combat effectiveness. 
 
If you want to increase the richness of your information you get that 
by sharing it.  The power of information comes in its ability to share 
it as opposed to the ability to hoard it. 
[Cebrowski, 22 Jan 2003]. 
 
With these increases, forces achieve enhanced shared situation 
awareness and self-synchronization amongst forces is faster.  This reduces the 
Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) [Cebrowski 1998] step between 
applications of forces and increases the “speed of command” and disrupting 
enemy’s OODA loop. 
In line with these tenets, there is a basic need to network forces together.  
Besides networking forces together, information must be made assessable, 
interoperable and understandable by users.  These will achieve shared 
situational awareness.  This shared awareness can then be translated to 
physical, actionable events. 
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D. DOMAINS OF NCW 
 
In Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework V2.0, John and 
David highlighted that changes must occur in the Physical, Information, Cognitive 
and Social domain before transformation in US DoD can happen. 
 
Figure 3.   NCO Domain [John & Albert, Jun 2004] 
 
 
1. Cognitive Domain and Social Domain 
The cognitive domain is the domain where people become aware of their 
situation, understand what is happening, make decisions and take effective 
action.  However, enabling individuals with enhanced awareness is necessary 
but insufficient to achieve the network centric effects.  Entities participating within 
an operation must collaborate and achieved shared awareness through the 
activities which [Albert &John Jun 2004] termed as shared sense-making.  The 

























shared sense-making.  Social interactions involve the cultural aspect of 
individuals, the team individuals are participating in and the larger context the 
team is operating within.   
 
2. Physical Domain and Information Domain 
Within the physical domain, strike, protect, deploy, and sustain operations 
takes place.  The physical domain spans the traditional dimension of warfare in 
land, air, sea and space.  It is within the physical domain where actions carried 
out and physical effects felt.  In the traditional sense, force-on-force comparisons 
are made in this domain.  To support NCW, network, communication and C2 
infrastructure are established within the physical domain.  It is within this domain 
that physical connectivity between nodes and network-ready nodes exist. 
Within the information domain, information is collected, disseminated and 
value added.  It is within this domain that situation awareness is shared though 
physical media, commander’s conveyed and the combat power of the traditional 
forces is enhanced through exploitation of information. 
Within this domain, the operatives also include contention for information.  
The fight is not conducted though the use of tanks, ships or planes, instead, it is 
conducted though the protection of information, speedy dissemination of 
information, disruption of enemy’s sources of information. 
It is within and between the physical and information domain where 
information are captured, disseminated and translated to physical effects, both 
domain need to be discussed as an integral whole.  In [John & Albert, 2004], key 
capabilities necessary within these domains are: 
1. Mobility.  Mobility is the ability to command and control on the 
move.  Entities are connected via networking infrastructure which 
allows them to have operational flexibility to access information 
from they are.  Without the need for a fixed network infrastructure, it 
allows rapid deployment of forces, with reduced need for network 
planning and supports flexible organizational structures. 
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2. Interoperability.  Interoperability is defined as 
the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and 
accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the 
services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively 
together.  The condition achieved among communications-
electronics systems or items of communications-electronics 
equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly 
and satisfactorily between them/or their users.  The degree of 
interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/DODdict/data/i/02749.html Accessed 
Nov 10 2004 
US DoD focused interoperability on the physical connectivity whereas 
NATA focused on the information sharing.  NATO specifies the following 
levels of information sharing 
a. No data exchanges 
b. Unstructured data exchange 
c. Seamless sharing of data and 
d. Seamless sharing of information 
 
3. Security.  Involves the protection of the integrity and functionality of 
the network and system systems, protection of information.  It 
spans the physical domain of network and infrastructure and the 
management of information and requires the support of policy, 




III. NETWORK CENTRICITY IN SINGAPORE’S FIGHT AGAINST 
SARS  
A. SARS INCIDENT IN SINGAPORE 
 
1. Early Stage of the Outbreak 
After the initial detection SARS virus in Singapore, the health 
professionals determined that standard infectious control measures would be 
sufficient to contain the outbreak.  However, as little was known about this new 
virus, there were no standard treatments.  Clinical judgment was required to 
determine if a person had been infected with SARS; medical professionals were 
unsure of the effectiveness of the isolation measures as the modes of 
transmission of the virus were not known4; in some cases, the virus led to 
complications in the patients while in others, the virus is masked by symptoms of 
common illness and went undetected5.  With these uncertainties, standard 
contingency plans were not effective. 
Media reports of the unknown and deadly nature of the virus seeded fear 
amongst the public.  People felt unsafe to conduct their normal daily routine for 
fear of contracting the disease. High risk area such as public transport, hospitals, 
clinics, crowded places and high risk people such health care workers were 
avoided.  The diagram below shows the early stage of the outbreak: 
                                            
4 WHO in March 03 - "But WHO does not know what is the right thing to do to control this 
disease nor would anyone else know." 
5 A 60 year-old man who suffered chronic kidney disease and diabetes had low grade fever 
and his chest X-ray were normal.  Nothing indicated that he might be infected with SARS.  He 
was treated in an open ward of a hospital and sparked an outbreak - infecting 62 people. 
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Figure 4.   Early Stage of the Outbreak 
 
It must be emphasized that the fear psychology of the society was so 
strong that it almost paralyzed Singapore.  It is also arguable that it is the fear 
factor which eventually garnered the government’s and people’s resolve to 
contain the spread of the virus.  The social psychology shaped the way 
Singapore Government and its people reacted to the episode. 
The unspoken fear on the streets can be infectious.  Even I – with 
my c’est la vie attitude about car accidents, deadly diseases and 
premature ends – entertain wild thoughts every now and then.  I 
look suspiciously at the chopsticks on my bowl of yong tau foo6.  I 
wonder if the escalator banister has traces of someone’s snot.  In 
my most imaginative moments, I imagine deadly invisible missiles 
of saliva shooting out of people’s mouth as they yak in a coffee 
shop.  I wish I never learnt what ‘exponential’ means.  Now, I find 
myself lying in bed working out the mathematical implication of a 
contagious disease and the kind of time frame before we all bite the 
dust.  





                                            
6 A favorite local dish in Singapore 
Unknown 











2. Deterioration of the Situation  
Within a short span of two weeks, the situation in Singapore deteriorated 
rapidly.  Several factors interplayed and provided negative feedback to each 
other.  This resulted in the situation spiraling out of control.  The primary cause of 
was the fear and anxiety of the public.  Due to the interplay and interdependence 
of factors, the situation is unpredictable.  An action or in-action that changes the 
current condition may lead to drastic deviation in the eventual outcome.  The 
situation has the characteristics of a non-linear, complex system. 
A non-linear, complex system is one in which a small difference in the 
initial conditions will result in a large variation in the eventual state of system. 
 
Figure 5.   Non Linear, Complex System 
 
As an example, a Singapore man was infected when he came in contact 
with an SARS index case.  Contact tracing of the index case failed to identify the 
male and he was not quarantined.  Subsequently, he fallen ill and visited two 
separate hospitals.  Both hospitals did not diagnose him as a SARS patient.  He 
sparked off an outbreak outside the hospital cordon into the community at large.  
The outbreak happened in Singapore’s primary fresh produce distribution centre 





Result in a 
large change 
in the final 
state 
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The outbreak disrupted 70% of fresh supplies to Singapore, affected the 
livelihood of thousands of stallholders and workers, posed high risk to evolve into 
a nation wide epidemic due to high human traffic and the connectivity these 
people have when they branch out to retail outlets and buyers. 
Besides all these factors, the Singapore Government was also fearful of 
outbreaks in key areas that may threaten the functioning of critical infrastructure 
in Singapore.  The various factors and looming fear intertwined and convoluted 
the entire situation. 
 
3. Intertwined Scale-Free Network of Problems 
To appreciate the intertwined nature of the situation, various factors and 
their effects on each other are mapped out.  Figure 4 probably resembles the 
interplay of the factors and the worries Singapore Government had during the 
height of the SARS outbreak. 
31 
 
Figure 6.   Intertwined Network of Problems 
 
Having determined the network of issues and their interaction, the 
Singapore government quickly determined that the center of the situation is the 
fear and anxiety of the public.  Along with it, several other factors such as 
international perception of situation in Singapore and the medical challenges 
were also critical in keeping the situation under control.  These are the hubs in a 
“scale-free” network.  Tackling these hubs will bring about the rapid collapse of 



















































































B. SOCIAL AND COGNITIVE DOMAIN OF THE SARS BATTLE 
 
1. Recognizing That There Will be a Problem 
The initial challenge in the battle is recognizing that there is a problem and 
the scope of its impact.  By linking pieces of information, staffs at the MOH 
determined that there is an outbreak at hand7.  However, they assessed that the 
problem is containable within the medical professionals.  On Mar 18, 2003, 
Minster for Health Mr Lim Hng Kiang reported to Singapore Parliament that there 
was no cause for alarm and was confident of the infection control measures.  The 
belief then was that SARS is transmitted by close contact.  However, lack of 
information about SARS, the public fear and anxiety it caused, media reports and 
Singapore positional as a key international transport hub forces resulted in the 
spillage of effects to other sectors of Singapore. 
It was only a few weeks after the detection of the first SARS patient in 
Singapore before the Singapore government determined that the situation is 
beyond medical domain and required other agencies to come in8. 
The challenge is how does one visualize the situation and determines that 
there is a potential problem based on information from multiple, seemingly 
unrelated sources.  From a complex, inter-reacting and dynamic situation, 
determine the underlying relationship and order, and predict or anticipate the 
future projectile of situation. 
 
 
                                            
7 On March 6, a TTSH doctor alerted Ministry of Health (MOH) Singapore about three 
patients with pneumonia-like diseases who are not responding to standard treatment.  Together 
with information that a medical evacuation team had been involved in transport a patient with a 
mysterious disease from Hanoi to Hong Kong and rumors of a mysterious pneumonia outbreak in 
southern China coalesced at MOH Singapore and allowed the ministry to piece together the 
possible scenario that they had a new disease outbreak at hand. [Chua Mui Hoong 2004] 
 
8 “Until April, SARS was primarily a problem residing with the Ministry of Health (MOH).  For 
much of March, the SARS battle was lef by Health Minister Lim Hng Kiang, PS MOH and its 
director of medical services Dr Tan Chorh Chuan.” [Chua Mui Hoong 2004  Pg 119]. 
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2. Collaborative Group Decision Making and Consensus Building 
Having an individual or a small group determined that there is a potential 
problem is insufficient.  This perceived problem must be conveyed and be shared 
by majority of the larger community concerned before effective actions can be 
taken.  Depending on social context, dynamics, individuals and the situation at 
hand, this ‘tipping point’ varies.  In some cases, a problem was identified, 
however due to circumstances; influences of various other factors and social 
dynamics, no actions were made to rectify the situation.  Breaching the tipping 
point usually requires the build-up of multiple, seemingly small events, 
culminating in the breach. 
By mid March, Ministry of Health recognized that it requires efforts from 
other agencies.  It enlisted the help from other agencies such as nurses from 
Health Promotion Board, Singapore; People’s Association, Singapore and Cisco 
in serving home quarantine orders; Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore and 
Ministry of Transport to screen travelers at border points. 
However, this recognition within Ministry of Health is not sufficient to 
breach the tipping point.  The early efforts were primarily from a single ministry – 
Ministry of Health. 
Feedback from concerned parents about the safety of sending their 
children to school, a powwow session between Deputy Prime Minister, Minster 
for Health and Minister for Education, and subsequently the decision to close 
schools for several weeks set the environment for group recognition that SARS is 
more than just a medical problem. 
A weekly Cabinet meeting held during April 03 provides the final tipping 
point.  As a result of the Cabinet meeting, decision was made on Apr 03 2004 to 
convene the Executive Group to deal with the SARS problem. 
 
3. Scoping the Problem and Determining the Solution 
Another key aspect in dealing with unconventional crisis is the scoping of 
the problem and the determination of solution.  Recognizing that there is a 
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serious situation at hand, the Singapore Government determined that the 
situation is a web of interlocking issues.  Tackling each issue by itself yields 
limited effects.  Tackling several issues at the same time, synchronizing and 
providing positive feedbacks to others issues will maximize the overall 
effectiveness.  However, to effectively execute and synchronize actions across 
different agencies required changes in the inter-agency processes. 
The Singapore Government also recognized that fear and public 
confidence is the heart of the situation.  Several task groups were formed 
tackling different aspects of the situation; however, the underlying aim for each 
task group was to restore public confidence and allay fear of the situation. 
 
C. INFORMATION AND PHYSICAL DOMAIN OF THE SARS BATTLE 
 
1. Changes in Organization and Processes 
Once it was recognized that fight is more than beyond medical problem 
and resources from agencies other the Ministry of Health were required, it was 
also recognized that the existing governmental organizational structure was 
unable to effectively deal with the situation.  The existing structure is effective 
and efficiency to deal with daily governance of the country but unable to deal the 
challenges of this unfamiliar situation. 
The creation of the Inter-ministerial Committee, the Executive Group and 
the Inter-Ministry SARS Operations Committee were perhaps the most important 
actions taken during the fight against SARS.  The structure provided horizontal 
and vertical integration of the various agencies involved in the fight against 
SARS.  It also provided increasing granularity of execution control.  The overall 
structure is as shown below: 
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Figure 7.   Organizational Structure for Fight Against SARS 
 
The 9-member Inter-Ministerial Committee was the forum for making 
strategic decisions and approved major decisions and control measures.  It 
provided guidance and oversight of the EG in the fight against SARS.  The Inter-
Ministerial Committee is chaired by Minister of Home Affairs and comprised 8 
other ministers.  The committee provided the horizontal integration across the 
ministries.  It ensures that the views from various ministries were consulted.  If 
necessary, decisions were further sanctioned by the Prime Minister or approved 
by Cabinet.  These decisions were handled down to EG to be implemented. 
The Core Executive Group (EG) was formed in early April comprising 
Permanent Secretary (PS) of Home Affairs, Health, Defense and Foreign Affairs.  
The EG is chaired by PS of Home Affairs.  Other ministries were roped in 
whenever necessary.  The EG was tasked to manage the crisis, coordinate and 



































Inter-Ministerial Operations Committee 
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EG develop plans, identified and allocated all necessary resources to 
implemented decisions made by the Inter-Ministerial Committee. 
To manage the efforts in finer resolutions, two sets of working committees 
were form: the Inter-Ministerial Operations Committee and focused subgroups. 
Sub working groups were formed to look into specific areas.  For example, 
one sub group was tasked to tackle all SARS related housing needs. The primary 
task was to provide emergency quarantine housing and working out contingency 
plans for en masse decanting of residents.  Other subgroups addressed 
transport, education, medical, border control, public communication and 
economic issues. 
These working groups rallied resources, which may be from other 
agencies, necessary to achieve their mission objectives.  As an example, the 
housing subgroup was responsible to provide housing needs such as emergency 
quarantine housing.  The subgroup enlisted the help of Tourist Promotion Board 
to get hoteliers in Singapore to provide guest rooms for people required to be 
quarantined; People Association to work out food distribution. 
The Inter-Ministerial Operations Committee on the other hand was 
established to strengthen inter agency coordination and operations.  The actions 
and activities of the subgroups were coordinated and synchronized through the 
Inter-Ministerial Operations Committee. 
Besides providing the necessary inter-agency integration, the 
organizational arrangement was also flexible enough to adapt to changing needs.  
Ministries and agencies may be roped in whenever it is deemed that their 
expertise or resources were required. 
 
2. Collaboration, Decision Making Process and Share Vision 
Having an organization that facilitated inter-agency integration and 
adaptable to situational needs alone is insufficient.  When different agencies 
came together, they each had their own perspective of the problem and 
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constraints.  Normal team building processes would take weeks if not months.  
However, in Singapore’s context and specifically the SARS incident, the process 
was much faster.  The likely reason for this could be the all involved felt the 
gravity of the situation.  Through daily updates, the Singapore government 
impressed upon the people and the civil sector the severity of the situation. 
The daily updates and media reports also functioned as an effective 
communication between the government and people.  Through honest and direct 
communication and updates to the public, the Singapore government was able to 
dispel fear and win the support and trust from of the people. 
The shared vision amongst the agencies and between the government 
and people hasten the decision making process, achieved synchronization and 
facilitated execution. 
 
3. Multi Agencies Processes and Executions 
With a shared visions and flexible organization, the Singapore government 
was able to plan and execute multi-agencies processes.  As an example, to 
restore consumer confidences and tourist, PM Goh directed for a “SARS-free 
corridor” be established.  The concept of the SARS-free corridor was simple – to 
ensure that the airports, seaports, hotels and tourist places were all SARS-free 
so that tourist can feel safe to visit Singapore. 
However, the execution is far from simple.  A task force was formed under 
Singapore’s Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI).  To create the sanitized 
corridor, Singapore’s MTI enlisted the help of Singapore’s Tourist Promotion 
Board (TPB).  Together, the two agencies worked out the “Cool Singapore” 
Program.  Under the program, an eight-point criterion9 was established for hotels 
and retail establishment to follow.  Certification teams would audit these 
establishments  every  two  weeks.  Within  two  weeks,  180 shopping malls had  
 
                                            
9 Appoint a SARS manager, conduct daily temperature checks on all their staffs, suppliers 
and vendors, disinfect premises daily and ensure staffs do not visit SARS-affected countries over 
the past 10 days. 
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been certified.  89 hotels, three limousine services, Changi Airport, The 
Esplanade10 and the Singapore Expo convention centre also participated in the 
program. 
To correct the perception tourist had about the situation in Singapore, a 
website was established, live webcams showing that people going about doing 
their daily chores in shopping malls were also provided.  An accompanying “Step 
Out Singapore” program was also launched together with the retailers.  The S$2 
million promotion effort lured back shoppers and tourists.  It was estimated that 
the promotion effort generated over S$180million in turnover.  More importantly, 
it drew people back onto the streets and shops again.  At the community level, 
Singapore’s National Environment Agency (NEA) launched the “Singapore’s OK” 
program to promote hygiene.  The Citizen’s Consultative Committee also worked 
with the NEA to spread the message to coffee shops, markets and other outlets. 
To correct the international perception of the situation in Singapore, a 
multi-agency, International Image task force was established.  The primary aim of 
the task force was to project Singapore’s international image during the crisis.  
The task force was head by Singapore’s Ministry of Information, Communication 
and Trade.  The task force included Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs which 
monitored media reports and sought to verify with hospitals or individuals. Other 
agencies included Contact Singapore, Ministry of Manpower, Singapore Tourist 
Promotion board, Economic Development, Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry and International Enterprise Singapore.  The task 
force verified the reports in various foreign media and alleged exportation of 
SARS cases to overseas.  It then worked through the various agencies and 
rectified the reports. 
 
4. Information Sharing 
To support the execution of the plans, information was shared freely 
between agencies.  For example, to prevent the exportation of SARS patients out 
                                            
10 Theatres on the Bay arts center. 
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of Singapore to other countries, the Immigrant Control received updated list of 
people served with home quarantine orders.  They could check and deny exit if 
anyone who was on home quarantine orders and attempted to leave the country. 
To effectively contain the spread of virus, a system of contact tracing was 
also established.  Whenever a patient is diagnosed with SARS, the contact 
tracing center in Ministry of Health will attempt to identify who might had came 
into contact with the patient.  These people were classified as ‘contacts’ and will 
be issued home quarantine. 
During the early stage, the contact tracing was carried out by a team of 
about 60 officials from Ministry of Health.  The contacts of a SARS patient range 
from his family members, his colleagues at his working place to staffs and other 
patients in hospital or clinics during the time he visited.  Pieces of information 
from various ministries and agencies were used to trace the contacts.  
Information from National Registration Office gives details of the patients of his 
family members; Ministry of Manpower provides information about his 
employment and information from hospitals provided details about patients and 
staffs that might be within the vicinity of the SARS patient concerned.  In the later 
stage, linking up the various databases improves the overall efficiency further. 
 
 
































5. Employment of Technology 
When SARS virus break out in Pasir Panjang Wholesale Center, some 
2,400 people needs to be contacted and determined if they needed to be served 
home quarantine orders.  The manual contact tracing systems showed its 
limitations.  The manual systems used spreadsheets and manual record keeping 
which was slow and inaccurate.  People were served with late quarantine orders 
or were served twice. 
The Defense Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) was roped to 
provide assistance in deploying technological solutions in the fight against SARS.  
Working with IT departments of various ministries, Singtel and Ministry of 
Information, Communications and the Arts (MITA), linkages between databases 
of several key institutions and agencies were established.  This increased the 
overall efficiency and effectiveness of contact tracing. 
To track the movement of staffs, patients and visitors to hospital, Radio 
Frequency ID (RFID) systems were deployed in hospitals.  RFIDs tags worn on 
waist tracked the movement of people, and logged down the time and place 
within the hospital a person had been to.  In the event when any person within 
the hospital was diagnosed with SARS, the database allowed the tracing of 
where he had been to in the hospital, at what time and who were around him at 
those points in time. 
 
D. THE GLOBAL BATTLE 
 
While Singapore established networks of people and procedures in the 
fight against SARS, it also participated in the larger global battle.  Singapore 
prevented exporting of SARS to other countries through its contact tracing 
system and tight border controls.  At its border checkpoints, Singapore 
established thermal scanners to seek out travelers who exhibited feverish 
condition.  Being a key traveler’s hub, this helped reduced the transportation of 
potential SARS patients between countries. 
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Singapore also participated in the global network of medical research to 
find solution to the deadly virus.  It was part of a network of 11 laboratories from 
around the world.  After several weeks, Genome Institute of Singapore (GIS) was 
the third to publish its SARS sequences and eventually presented the most 
number of genome sequences.  With a large pool of sequences and through 
sharing with other institutes around the world, GIS also determined that the virus 
has a mutation rate of 0.03 per cent per generation.  Singapore also participated 
in the WHO Global Outbreak and Alert network. 
 
E. LESSONS LEARNT 
 
From the SARS episode, we learned that to deal with unconventional, 
evolving situation, there is a need to take a network-centric view of situation.  
One needs to identify issues involved and the interaction between these nodes.  
This will help in the formulation of the solution.  However, one also needs to 
recognize the fluidity of the situation.  Due to this, a multi-agency and flexible 
organization is essential.  This allowed rapid adaptation to deal with the situation. 
Ad hoc organization comprises people from diverse backgrounds and 
culture.  To enhance the effectiveness of ad hoc teams, it is essential to rapidly 
identify and foster a common vision which all can agree and associate with. 
Free flowing of information is also required to enable the execution of 
inter-agency processes.  Technology can be deployed to further enhance the 
overall effectiveness and efficiency of newly created inter-agency processes.  
Human are flexible in adapting to situation but are prone to make mistakes when 
under stress, executing new routines.  Technology can be deployed to assist the 
human and minimize such mistakes. 
Technology can also be deployed to enhance the interoperability of 
organizations.  Mobile solutions will provide ground enforcers the mobility and 
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IV. REQUIREMENT FOR NETWORK CENTRIC OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this section, we will discuss the requirements for a technical 
architecture that can support the use of network centric operations concepts to 
deal with unconventional crisis.   This architecture can help to maximize the 
effectiveness of a multi-agency task force comprising of both fixed and mobile 
teams sharing the common objective of combating an asymmetric threat like a 
biological or disease outbreak in an urban and highly populated area.  The 
Singapore SARS incidence will be used as a case study to substantiate the 
requirement, scope the problem into an appropriate context and validate the 
effectiveness of the architecture.   
Due to the high degree of uncertainty and the need for large scale cross 
agency coordination, the tackling of asymmetric threats like the SARS virus 
presents unique challenges. Thus, having the ability to deal with the rapidly 
changing situation, anytime and anywhere, is paramount.  Fundamentally the 
capability to communicate and collaborate while on the move would be a key 
enabler and a critical success factor. 
 
B. BACKGROUND AND BROAD REQUIREMENTS 
 
We will begin by discussing the broad requirements of the technical 
architecture.  The following are the key focus for the technical architecture: 
• To achieve the required level of shared situation awareness by 
improving information sharing and enabling seamless exchange of 
information between the different agencies, taking into considerations 
the heterogeneous setup. 
• To enhance communication and collaboration between the multi-
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agency task force involved in the combat of an asymmetric threat like 
the SARS outbreak. 
• To maintain the responsiveness and the agility of the mobile teams.    
• To help the users make accurate and timely decisions.  
This architecture shall be developed in the context of Singapore, which is 
a small city state comprising of mostly densely populated areas.  The information 
technology and communication infrastructure in Singapore is highly developed 
with broadband and cellular phone coverage close to 99%.   With the fruition of 
the IT2000 vision that started in 1992, Singapore has transformed into an 
intelligent island where information technology is embedded in all aspects of the 
daily life for the Singapore citizen. [Yong].  Though the Civil Service 
Computerization Program (CSCP) that started in 1981 to computerized and 
interconnect all the ministries, statutory boards and government linked 
organizations, the entire government is now fully computerized with many 
government services accessible round the clock from the Internet. Thus, it may 
appear that the development of an architecture to facilitate multi-agency 
information sharing and collaboration is an easily achievable task.  However, this 
may not be so as the entire CSCP took many years to complete using different 
generations of technologies involving mainframes, client-server systems and 
web-based systems.  Also, most of the computerization programs started off with 
the core objective of enhancing internal workflow and efficiency. Asymmetric 
threats demanding rapid information sharing and collaboration across different 
agencies on an ad-hoc basis is a recent requirement.  This is currently 
associated from the homeland security perspective.  Most of the systems were 
not designed and constructed to fit into the kind of flexible environment required 
to enable ad-hoc interoperation between different agencies. Therefore, the 
challenge is to develop an architecture that will allow the heterogeneous system 
and technology from the different agencies to work seamlessly to tackle a 
complex and time-critical problem, like the SARS situation in Singapore.   
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1. Key Challenges Involved                  
The challenge in dealing with such an asymmetric threat can be 
characterized as follows: 
Firstly, the task force has to deal with a situation where there is incomplete 
and inconsistent information.  The information could be wrong or mutually 
conflicting.  Next is the need to work on a compressed timeline where time critical 
decisions are made in real time using all available information at the point in time. 
Lastly, the situation could demand the need to make decisions that could 
potentially have significant outcomes at a time where the situation is still 
undergoing rapid changes and a complete and consistent picture of the situation 
is not yet available.      
 
C. KEY CONSIDERATIONS                  
 
After understanding the context of the SARS problem, the key 
considerations of our proposed architecture are summarized below: 
• There are multiple agencies involved, all with different processes and 
information requirements. 
• There are heterogeneous computer and communication systems, with 
different Operating Systems, hardware and applications software. 
• There are different data formats involved.  Not all the information can 
be available for extraction. Some could be proprietary. 
• There is no single working solution available that can bind all the 
different systems together. 
• The current solutions developed for NCW are skewed towards the 
needs of the military and build on the assumptions of the military. The 
military have some unique characteristics like having a well-defined 
hierarchical command structure, a doctrine driven workflow, a set of 
clear and distinct procedures to deal with different problems together 
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with constant training and retraining.  Thus, the military can have the 
option to approach new problems by evolving existing system of 
solutions.  A paramilitary or non-military multi-agency setup does not 
have any of these characteristics and advantages to exploit.  
• The proposed solution to interface and retrieve relevant information 
from the respective databases must not adversely impact the 
functionality and performance of the existing system. 
• The recommended set of solutions in the architecture must tap on 
existing infrastructure and technology, comprising of software and tools 
that are easy to learn and use.  It shall support ubiquitous deployment 
requiring little or no effort to setup and configure.   
 
D. USERS OF THE SYSTEM                  
 
In order to develop a comprehensive set of solutions that will form the 
architecture to meet the needs of the various groups of users and stakeholders, 
we will first attempt to categorize the different roles that are involved in the 
combat of SARS or similar biological and disease outbreak.   
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Figure 9.   Four Different Classes of Users to be Supported. 
 
As shown in Figure 9, there are four different classes of users that the 
system must support: 
 
1. Decision Makers   
The system must provide all the relevant executive level information and 
ensure that the decision makers attain the right level of situation awareness at all 
times to support their decision needs. A set of decision support tools shall be 
available to help manage alerts, monitor feedbacks, facilitate collaboration, 
provide context for the developing situation, disseminate orders and monitor the 
outcome of the decision.  For this thesis, users in the SARS Executive Group fall 
into this category.  
 
2. Operations Coordinators   
This group of users will implement the decisions and the directions set by 
the decision makers. They are responsible for ensuring seamless inter-agency 
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coordination by formulating the requirements for cross agency integration and 
process automation.  They also work out the inter-agency processes and are 
responsible for orchestrating and calibrating the roles, responsibilities and 
workflow required for the ad-hoc teams to accomplish their mission.   
 
3. Mobile Executers   
They are mainly responsible for taking actions and enforcing decisions, 
which they can receive in real time while on the move.  Mobile users also act as 
on-site human sensors providing real time ground information back to the 
operation headquarters.  An example for such user is those responsible for 
serving quarantine orders for suspected SARS victim.   
 
4. Content Managers   
The Content Managers determine what information the decision makers 
and the various groups of users will need to perform their job.  They have direct 
access to myriad sources of information and rely on software tools to discover, 
translate, reformat, filter and churn out the required type and level of information 
to support the respective group of users.  The system shall provide a set of tools 
to work on the multiple formats of information that are drawn from the 
heterogeneous data sources, independent of Operating Systems, applications 
and hardware platform.  
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V. TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE TO SUPPORT NETWORK 
CENTRIC OPERATIONS FOR UNCONVENTIONAL CRISIS 
A. ARCHITECTURE FOR UNCONVENTIONAL CRISIS  
 
After reviewing the objectives, requirements and key considerations, the 
proposed architecture that uses the network centric operations concept to 
combat unconventional crisis is depicted in Figure 10. 
This architecture helps to ensure that a network of distributed organization 
components comprising of fixed and mobile elements can exchange information 
and coordinate activities in a flexible and scaleable manner.  There are several 
key components to the architecture.  The Unified Information Bus enables the 
seamless exchange of information between the various agency and software 
modules.  A set of middleware solutions shall interface with the heterogeneous 
data sources which include the databases, file systems and data repositories.  
Through the set of middleware solutions, disparate sources of data shall be 
retrieved, filtered, reformatted, translated and collated into a collection of 
common data sources that can be formulated into an integrated, relevant and 
consistent situation picture.  The Content Managers shall use a set of Meta-Data 
Management Tools and Data Processing Tools to perform unification of data 
dictionary and defining the data requirements needed for the mission.  The 
Unified Information Bus enables the seamless exchange of information between 
the various agency and software modules.  There is also a set of software 
modules and tools that can help enable the operation of the ad-hoc teams.  
Finally, the support for mobile computing shall be enabled by a set of Mobile 
Information Services that delivers timely and relevant information to the Mobile 
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Figure 10.   Technical Architecture For Unconventional Crisis. 
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B. UNIFIED INFORMATION BUS  
 
The Unified Information Bus is the key enabler for shared situation 
awareness in the ad-hoc organization.  Having situation awareness implies that 
one is aware and understands what is happening within a given environment at a 
given time.  It is therefore crucial for users to be able to subscribe to information 
that is relevant for the mission.  The Unified Information Bus can be implemented 
through the Message-Oriented middleware and critical information will be 
published as structured XML messages, facilitating loosely coupled 
asynchronous communication between applications.  
 
C. DATA INTEROPERABILITY  
 
To ensure the interoperability of an ad-hoc multi-agency task force, we 
must first ensure the interoperability of the people and the processes of the 
respective agencies.  In order to realize this requirement, data interoperability is 
the key.   Data interoperability allows the sharing and integration of data from the 
data sources of the different agencies regardless of hardware, operating 
systems, programming languages and databases.  It involves the identification, 
retrieval, filtering, formatting, merging and translation of disparate data sources 
into a coherent information source that can be shared to raise the situation 
awareness of the ad-hoc teams. 
While the derivation of a common data dictionary can facilitate effective 
sharing and exchange of information between the various agencies, it can be an 
extremely difficult, complex, costly and time consuming task.  However, this is an 
essential pre-requisite to achieving data interoperability and this section will 
examine how it can be achieved.  
The military have frequently talked about the need to have a common, 
relevant and sharable situation picture in the literatures for NCW.  Analogously, 
in the fight against SARS, we need our Decision Makers, Operations Coordinator 
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and Mobile Enforcers to get access to all the relevant information and attain the 
right level of situation awareness for the job.  There is a need to collate the 
information from the data sources of the various agencies together with 
information from the open sources like the newspapers and the Internet.   
The essential steps to achieve data interoperability are: 
 
1. Identify the Information Requirement for the Mission     
We begin by identifying the type of information required for a specific 
mission. An often heard notion is that due to a lack of precedence in dealing with 
some types of asymmetric threats, it is not possible to identify the complete set of 
information requirement.   While this statement may be true, it is still essential to 
identify the best possible subset of the information needed so that a more 
efficient search and retrieval mechanism can be built.  This is critical in ensuring 
that the right information can be located and accessed in a timely manner.  To 
meet other information needs that can arise on an ad-hoc basis, a general text 
search engine similar to the facilities found in Internet searches, shall be 
provided.   
An example of identifying mission specific information from the SARS 
episode can be seen in the case when there was a need to perform contact 
tracing of people in order to contain the spread of the SARS virus.  Since this 
involved knowing exactly where a particular person lives, where he does his 
regular activities and his movement within and outside of the country together 
with the list of people who are in close contact with him, the information required 
will need to come from the data sources of a few agencies. 
 
2. Identify the Data Sources to Fulfill the Requirement              
In a multi-agency setup, each individual agency have their data dictionary 
and data sources like databases and file system closely integrated into their 
respective mission and work processes.  Each agency can contribute to the 
information needs of the newly defined mission of the ad-hoc organization. The 
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respective Content Managers will have to derive the details of the information 
requirement, deciding on the data fields and the format involved.  The Content 
Managers will identify how the different data sources from the various agencies 
can be collated to fulfill the information requirement of the mission.  If the data 
involved is expected to change over time, the rate and means of update will need 
to be addressed. 
To better identify the data fields and format involved, the Content Manager 
for each agency will have to review their respective data dictionary. In cases 
where the data dictionary is not available or out-of-date, the Content Manager will 
have to define and update the data dictionary where necessary.  The next step is 
to integrate and normalize the data dictionaries of the various agencies to derive 
a common operation database required for the mission.  This data dictionary will 
contain meta-data information embedding domain specific knowledge about the 
data objects.  The completed data dictionary will consist of all structured and 
unstructured information required for the newly defined mission and serve as a 
standard data definition and reference for the various agencies involved.  
 
3. Identify the Information Needs for the Different Roles of a 
Mission                   
 The different roles in a given mission will have their individual information 
needs. To maintain the appropriate context and to prevent information overload, 
the Content Managers will need to match the information needs associated with 
the role to the available sources of information. It would be useful to have a 
matrix that clearly depicts the role, the information needs and the interface 
involved.  
For example, for the task force that is involved in contact tracing of SARS 
suspect, the Mobile Enforcer who is responsible for confirming the home address 
of the SARS suspect will only need the name, address and a photograph of the 
person.   The Operations Coordinator for this particular mission who will decide 
on the extensiveness and the number of levels for the contact trace will need  
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more elaborated information associated with a person’s movement, daily 
activities and the resources available to execute the contact tracing. 
 
4. Retrieval of the Data Sources                   
After identifying the information requirements and how these requirements 
can be fulfilled, the Content Managers will need to examine the physical 
attributes of the various data sources.  The operating systems, hardware 
platform, database packages, file types, file formats for each of the data sources 
will need to be examined so that appropriate solutions can be implemented to 
ensure that all the required information can be retrieved from the heterogeneous 
sources. 
 
5. Processing of the Retrieved Data Sources                   
After acquiring the required data from the various sources, the data will 
need to be filtered to eliminate the unwanted attributes and values. Some of the 
data may require reformatting so that internal representation implemented for 
storage and communication efficiency can be processed and exchanged as 
meaningful text.  After filtering and reformatting the data, the various sources can 
then be merged to form the common pool of collated information sources which 
can be subsequently integrated into a comprehensive situation picture.  Further 
processing on the collated information sources are needed to ensure that 
applications that require a subset of the information or information of a different 
resolution can also make use of the collated information source.   
 
D. TOOLS TO ENABLE DATA INTEROPERABILITY  
 
There are several possible technical solutions that can help to enable data 
interoperability, all involving different levels of cost, effort, ease of scaling and 
complexities.  The most expensive option is to take into account the multi-agency 
interoperability requirement and implement a new system to support it.  The 
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cheapest alternative would be to develop specific data wrappers for the data 
interfaces that were identified by the Content Managers, who must already have 
a good understanding of the data model and have an intimate knowledge of the 
type and format of the data required.  As there is a need to preserve the 
functionality and investment of existing system, the most optimal approach is to 
leverage on commercial off-the-shelf middleware solution and use the set of data 
adapters and connectors provided to implement a common interface for 
retrieving the required information across the heterogeneous data sources.   
Furthermore, COTS middleware solution offers a host of other capabilities 
including transaction management, collaboration management, directory 
services, system resilience and security.     
 
1. Meta-data Management Tools                   
These set of tools will help the Content Managers to derive a common 
data dictionary by allowing the users to easily sieve out the essential database, 
tables and fields independent of differences in hardware, Operating Systems and 
database software. It allows the Content Managers to work at the meta-data level 
and focus on the means to support the information requirement of the new 
mission, using the myriad of data sources from the different agencies.  
The Schema Repository Manager provides a universal repository for the 
schemas of the various agencies, ensuring that the version control and access 
control to the data models are centrally managed.  Thus, it provides the 
appropriate check-in and check-out mechanism at various granularities, centrally 
managing the operations up to table and file level. In this case, different Content 
Managers can concurrently work on the schemas that they are responsible for 
and the entire schema will be in-sync with each other. 
The Data Modeling Tools allows the Content Managers to have a 
schematic view of all the databases and fields involved. It also provides a 
graphical interface that shields the Content Managers away from the 
complexities of the various Data Definition Languages associated with the 
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different databases that they will need to work with.   The tool will greatly assist 
the Content Manager in identifying, refining and normalizing the data from 
different applications into a common scheme that will form the unified data 
dictionary. 
The XML Schema generator takes the consolidated data models and use 
the meta-data to automatically produce the XML-Data Schema or the DTD 
(Document Type Definition) documents. They provide the required reference for 
the data elements in an XML document and the relationship among the 
elements, enabling data to be shared across multiple independent parties.                           
 
2. Middleware                   
The definition and categorization of middleware is very broad but can be 
viewed from two perspectives. From a developer’s perspective, middleware is a 
set of Application Programming Interface (API) calls that can accelerate the 
development of a distributed system by insulating the developers from the 
complexities of platform, operating system and software differences associated 
with a distributed environment. From the perspective of a system architect, 
middleware is robust connector that integrates a diverse set of solutions that 
were developed over a period of time, in a distributed environment, into a 
scalable, reliable and heterogeneous solution. [Britton & Bye] For the purpose of 
this thesis, a middleware is a set of software that can help bridge two or more 
applications together and provides interoperability between systems by providing 
a standard mode of communications between the software from different vendors 
through some form of conversion or translation mechanism. The complex task of 
handling differences in operating systems, network, hardware, programming 
language and data format are encompassed within the set of middleware.  
Middleware are useful for the building and integration of distributed 
applications in a heterogeneous environment. It can manage transaction 
processing, both in a synchronous and asynchronous settings.  It enables 
information exchange between different systems.   Therefore it is able to support 
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the implementation of a technical architecture in a multi-agency setup.  Individual 
agency can continue to maintain their existing IT infrastructure and use one or 
more middleware solutions to enable interoperability between the various 
agencies. 
Middleware solutions can be classified as follows [Emmerich] : 
a. Transactional Middleware 
Transactional middleware supports transactions among distributed 
components through some mechanisms to ensure consistency, like the two-
phase commit protocol.  There are two approaches to implementing transaction 
management. The first approach leverages on the transaction management 
capabilities of the relational database management system.  In the second 
approach, a distributed transaction manager is used so that heterogeneous 
databases can be updated in a single transaction.   
b. Message-Oriented Middleware 
Message-Oriented middleware provides an asynchronous 
messaging model for distributed applications to exchange messages. It can 
include business logic for routing of messages and reformatting of data.  The 
Message-Oriented middleware is particularly suited for implementing distributed 
event notification and publish-subscribe mechanism.   
c. Procedural Middleware 
Procedural middleware primarily deals with synchronous 
communication between one client and one server through Remote Procedure 
Call (RPC).  Thus, after Procedure A1 from workstation A calls Procedure B2 
from workstation B, it waits for the response.  Since it uses RPC, Procedural 
middleware can make use of NDR (Network Data Representation) to define 
standardized data representation of request and results across heterogeneous 
environment.  
d. Object and Component Middleware 
The Object and Component Middleware includes component 
models like the Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) from 
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Object Management Group (OMG), Microsoft’s Distributed Component Object 
Model (DCOM) and Enterprise JavaBeans (EJB) from Sun.  This group of 
middleware can execute processes in real-time and can run anywhere in the 
network.  They integrate the capabilities of the transactional, message-oriented 
and procedural middleware. 
e. Enterprise Application Integration Middleware 
Enterprise Application Integration (EAI) middleware allows 
disparate applications to share information, using adapters that can help convert 
the native formats of the systems being connected into the canonical protocols 
and formats being defined at the EAI hub.  This will facilitate interoperability 
between systems of different generations. [Vinoski] 
f. Web Services Middleware & XML  
Web Services and XML are the latest addition to the class of 
middleware solution and has been touted as a highly promising technology that 
can enable seamless interoperability in a heterogeneous computing environment. 
According to the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), web service is defined as 
“a software system designed to support interoperable machine-to-machine 
interaction over a network. It has an interface described in a machine-
processable format (specifically Web Services Description Language WSDL). 
Other systems interact with the Web service in a manner prescribe by its 
description using SOAP messages, typically conveyed using HTTP with an XML 
serialization in conjunction with other Web-related standards”. Thus, a web 
service provides a set of specific functions to its users through well-defined 
interfaces and encapsulates details of its internal implementation from the user of 
the service.  Though the web service technology is still in its infant stage, it looks 
extremely promising.  The key enabler for web services is the eXtensible Markup 
Language (XML).  XML is a subset of SGML (Standard Generalized Markup 
Language), an ISO-standard document markup language that has been in used 
for a number of years. Both the data and the meta-data are embedded in an XML 
document.  All the data in an XML document are represented as character 
strings.   The tags used in an XML document are self-defining and unlimited.  
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Thus, any form of data can be defined and tailored to the application’s need. As 
long as the sender and the receiver understands a common exchange format 
through the XML schema or DTD, heterogeneous applications can exchange 
information and interoperate, independent of operating systems, applications and 
hardware.   The major disadvantage of using XML is the substantial amount of 
file storage and transmission overheads incurred by maintaining the entire 
document in text character format together with the meta-data tags.  
Choice of Middleware Solution 
Since there are many different types of middleware solution all having 
their respective capabilities and weakness, we will need to align the choice with 
our requirement in order to find the right middleware solution for the architecture.  
In the current setup, there are multiple agencies with technologies from various 
timeframe.  There are web-enabled Microsoft and Linux base system.  There are 
also legacy mainframes and minicomputer systems that could have captured 10 
to 15 years of information with many supporting applications and business rules 
closely embedded into the workflow of the agency.   One of the key requirements 
for any new interface into the legacy system is to ensure that it is non-intrusive 
and will not adversely affect the performance of the existing system.    
As the primary objective is to have access to have access to the data 
sources of multiple agencies and enable data interoperability, Transactional and 
Procedural Middleware is not required.   Most Object and Component 
middleware are tightly coupled to a specific Operating System platform or 
programming language and is also more complex to work with. Thus, a 
Message-Oriented Middleware that can provide the connectors to a diverse set 
of data sources on many heterogeneous platforms including the legacy 
mainframe system would be a suitable choice. Some examples of such products 
are the MQ Series from IBM and SonicMQ from Sonic Software.   Keeping in 
mind the longer term vision of a Service Oriented Architecture where applications 
from different platforms can interoperate, all information shall be transmitted and 
stored in XML format.  In a Service Oriented Architecture, applications will be 
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running as web services and can be shared across different agencies. For 
example, a Decision Maker in the ad-hoc task force can execute an application 
from the Immigration Department to gain more in-depth knowledge of the human 
traffic at the key entry points into the country, without the need to install another 
specialized application to get the information. 
 
3. Data Processing Tools 
These are specifically developed applications or customized COTS tools 
that can help to implement the data processing rules that were identified by the 
Content Managers.  Certain information will need to be reformatted to 
homogenize the different representation that is referring to the same thing or 
have the same meaning. Reformatting involves the changing of how information 
of an entity is being presented so that it conforms to the field descriptor in the 
data dictionary.  For example, the different agencies may represent a date field in 
a variety of formats.  There is a need to reformat the date information according 
to the specification in the data dictionary to facilitate information sharing and 
downstream automation.  Next, data that are not in the standard type may need 
to be translated accordingly.  For example, images that are stored in a 
proprietary data type may need to be converted to a well known data type like 
JPG and GIF before it can be shared with other agencies that may be using 
standard image viewing software and not the specialized software.     
The kinds of tools required will largely depend on the format and the type 
of data.  For example, data coming from a relational database would require a 
SQL-capable data manipulation language for processing and formatting.  File 
content manipulation programs can be developed to process information stored 
in files, which can include plain text files, word processor documents, PDF 





4. An Example of Data Interoperability Solution 
Using the information from the unified data dictionary that maps out the 
data requirements for the different missions and the location of the data sources 
to fulfill the data requirement, an application can be developed that leverage on 
the Message-Oriented Middleware to retrieve the required data from the various 
data sources.  The set of Data Processing Tools will perform the data 
manipulation operation including, where necessary, reformatting and translating 
the data. Next, the data will be stored in a common repository as XML 
documents according to the specified XML Schema or DTD. Subsequently, the 
XML document will be published onto the Unified Information Bus.    
 
E. ENABLING AD-HOC TEAMS 
 
As discussed earlier, the ad-hoc team can be broken down into four main 
classes of users.  This section will discuss solutions that will be useful for users 
in a desktop environment, which encompasses the Decision Maker, Operations 
Coordinator and the Content Manager. Solutions for the Mobile Enforcer will be 
discussed in the section on Mobile Computing. 
 
1. Situation Collation Manager 
The Situation Collation Manager makes use of the defined information 
profile for a particular user and actively pulls and collates the relevant information 
from the various data sources through the Unified Information Bus into a 
comprehensive and relevant situation picture.  This can help the users get a 
quick appreciation of the situation. The information profile of a user specifies the 
information requirement with respect to the assigned task.  One example of how 
the Situation Collation Manager is useful in the combat against SARS is to 
ensure that all relevant information of new SARS suspects in a certain area can 
be automatically collated and routed to the relevant group of users for attention 
and further actions.  
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2. Information Dissemination Manager 
The Information Dissemination Manager provides an environment for the 
Operations Coordinator to make use of the information profile associated with a 
particular user or group of users and configure a set of rules that specifies how 
information should be shared.  The information will then be automatically 
disseminated according to the stipulated rules.  This helps to ensure that relevant 
information gets routed to the right user in a timely manner. 
  
3. Information Update Tracker 
This module will work with the Information Dissemination Manager and is 
responsible for ensuring that the users operate with the most updated piece of 
information.  Thus, users who had previously received a piece of information gets 
updated automatically in a timely manner when that piece of information has 
changed.  For example, if an initial report of a suspected SARS outbreak in a 
certain building is found to be untrue,  the Information Update Tracker shall send 
an immediate update to all the relevant Decision Makers and Operations 
Coordinator to keep them aware of the changes.    
  
4. Access Control Manager 
The Access Control Manager is responsible for ensuring the security of 
information access by the members of the ad-hoc team.  Primarily, it will help to 
authenticate the users and verify their access rights to the various sources of 
information.  The access rights can be applied to a single user or a group of 
users.  The access rights are assigned through a fine grain access matrix that 
captures the access of information right down to the fields of the information.  It 
also captures the type of operation the users can perform on the information, by 
specifying the rights to creating a new piece of information, updating or deleting 
of information and the right to query the various data sources, including 
databases and file systems.  
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5. Search and Query Manager 
As there is a need to operate in an unknown situation, the ability to quickly 
locate the correct piece of information is paramount. The search and query 
facility is the key to discovering hidden knowledge within the heterogeneous data 
sources.  The Search and Query Manager allows the users to perform both 
structured and unstructured search through a graphical interface.  For structured 
search, pre-canned queries to specific information sources are provided. This 
form of query is very useful for sieving information from the databases of the 
various agencies.  For search on unstructured information, one or more key 
words could be specified and the text search engine will return documents with 
the exact phrase or documents with phrases that have the same meaning or 
concept.  Thus, with such context sensitive search capability, if we are searching 
for documents that contain the keyword “pharmacy”, documents containing the 
phrase “Drug Store”, “Longs” and “Walgreen” will also be returned as part of the 
result. The search condition can also be configured to only return documents that 
match exactly the keyword for the search, producing a very specific set of search 
results.   Multimedia information including images, audio and video sources that 
have been appropriately indexed could also be returned as part of the search 
results. 
The search engine will operate through a direct interface provided by the 
middleware to the myriad of data sources available.   Each user is allowed to 
query for the information according to the access control matrix captured in the 
Access Control Manager. The results of the query shall be displayed in a list 
sorted according to the date and time of the information or the relevancy.  
Alternatively, the results of the query shall be displayed in a list, sorted by the 
search criteria of the query that was specified.  The users can retrieve the details 
of the record by clicking on one or more items from the list of results returned 




6. Dynamic Process Manager 
The Dynamic Process Manager allows the Operations Coordinator to 
define the working process for the newly formed ad-hoc organization or team. It 
can help to capture the roles and responsibilities of all the sub-group in the ad-
hoc team. It can also help to describe how the various sub-groups communicate 
with each other. It defines the information profile for each sub-group, which is the 
information required by each sub-group to perform its role. It also specifies the 
information that each sub-group is responsible to produce and share with the rest 
of the ad-hoc organization. Thus, it captures the set of information to be 
exchanged amongst the sub-groups.  Subsequently, it can automate the 
dissemination and updating of critical information and orders within the ad-hoc 
organization with the help of Information Dissemination Manager and the 
Information Update Tracker.  Thus, it provides the complete view of the mode of 
operation for the ad-hoc organization.  
The Dynamic Process Manager can help the members of the ad-hoc team 
to transit smoothly into their new structure and adjust to the unfamiliar workflow 
and processes required by their role in the new setup.  It works with the Event 
Alert Manager, the Information Dissemination Manager and the Information 
Update Tracker to free the team members from consciously ensuring that 
mundane tasks get the required attention and are handled promptly. Some 
examples of such tasks includes the monitoring of incoming information for 
anomalies which could trigger the execution of other actions and the 
disseminating of new information that one is suppose to share. 
 
7. Event Alert Manager 
The Event Alert Manager consists of two key components. The Event 
Manager helps in the capturing of significant events that requires monitoring. The 
Alert Manager will actively monitor the incoming information and alert the end 
user when the defined threshold is breached.   
Both the modules can be integrated into a responsive and powerful 
solution to help in the combat of SARS. For example, there may be a need to 
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implement the rule that all newly discharged patients or SARS suspect from Tan 
Tock Seng Hospital can only return to the same hospital for medical treatment 
within 21 days of their discharge. The rule can be defined in the Event Manager, 
by capturing the key attributes that defines this event including the patient’s 
record together with the validity period for this event, which in this example is 21 
days. As the set of modules is operated in a distributed environment supported 
by a robust middleware for the exchange of critical information, the Alert 
Manager of other hospitals will use the event defined in the Event Manager at 
Tan Tock Seng Hospital to automatically monitor the personal information of 
incoming patients and alert the respective hospital registrar when the rule is 
breached.  Thus, these modules can work together to ensure that patients will 
not be able to violate the rule and potentially bring the SARS infection into 
another hospital.  These solutions can be extended to alert all medical 
practitioners in private clinics.  Similarly, inter-agency coordination can be further 
enhanced if the events defined at Tan Tock Seng hospital can be monitored by 
the Alert Manager operated at the immigration department to ensure that the 
SARS patient cannot leave the country while there is still a risk of spreading the 
infection.    
 
8. Collaboration Tools 
The collaboration tools allow the different users in the ad-hoc organization 
to work together in real-time to do planning, resolve any exigencies and conflicts 
in resource allocation and complete the required group tasking in the most 
optimal manner. Such a collaborative environment would also be the backbone 
that facilitates the group decision making process as it provides the means to 
discuss and arrive at a decision.  A computerized whiteboard can be used as a 
medium where the various stakeholders can come together to share information 
and rationalize their thoughts in real time, without the need for a face to face 
meeting.   Such collaboration environment also helps disparate groups of people 
to be linked together and maintain a common situational awareness. It also helps  
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geographically dispersed personnel exchange knowledge, co-ordinate actions 
and effect decisions efficiently. 
 
9. Analysis & Simulation Tools 
This is an interface to a set of tools that supports analysis and decision 
making for the combat of asymmetric threats like the SARS outbreak.  
The Link Analysis Tool allows users to retrieve information on key entities 
and links and graphically model them so that decision makers can get a graphical 
view of how the various factors interact and get a better understanding of the 
complex relationship amongst the entities.  This helps to unveil evidence that 
were not apparent when looking at them in isolation, as a single piece of 
information. In the combat of SARS, the Link Analysis Tool can help to correlate 
the critical elements in the disease network. It can also be used to trace the 
spread of the virus, providing the critical information required for contact tracing 
of SARS suspect.  
  
 
Figure 11.   Example of using Link Analysis Tool to trace the SARS Infection 
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As there is a need to deal with the unknown which is a key characteristic 
of asymmetric threats, having an interface to access a Modeling and Simulation 
environment can be useful for analyzing the effects of future plans and 
understanding the behavior of the disease.  The simulation test-bed can provide 
a controlled environment for users to rapidly obtain the required results by 
executing the plans over compressed time. It allows one to perform sensitivity 
analysis and is a good training tool.  Thus, decision makers can be better 
equipped to tackle issues concerning resource allocation and optimization, 
capacity planning, detection of bottlenecks, validation and comparison of 
execution plans.  The Modeling and Simulation environment can help the users 
to learn, train and evolve their strategies to better prepare them in dealing with 
the rapidly changing situations.  In the combat of SARS, having a simulation 
environment that can accurately model the spread of the virus will greatly help in 
the development and evaluation of the various disease containment strategies. 
 
F. SUPPORT FOR MOBILE COMPUTING 
 
To be effective in the combat of asymmetric threats in an urban 
environment, the ability to support the needs of the mobile users is important. 
There will be a lot of mobile teams moving in the city performing a variety of task 
that can include rescue work, law enforcement, information gathering or directly 
dealing with the threat.   Having the ability to communicate and collaborate while 
on the move will enable them to perform their duties well.  It is crucial for the 
mobile users to be able to receive mission critical information and send situation 
updates in real time, working within the constraints of the mobile device, 
communication infrastructure and bandwidth.   
 
1. Mobile Gateway Module 
The Mobile Gateway Module is a series of software responsible for 
ensuring that all the mobile users can securely and efficiently gain access to the  
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information services that is required for their task. It also processes the incoming 
messages from the mobile users.   
The module will authenticate users and check their access rights to the 
information services.  It has the ability to serve information to a series of PDAs 
and WAP-enabled devices by ensuring that the XML encoded content gets 
translated into the markup language that the requesting mobile device can 
process.  Thus, the information can be served in HTML, WML, CHTML and 
XHTML.   Through this module, users can access the information at any place 
and at any time, by the executing the required JSP or ASP script.  
 
2. Priority Information Alert Service.   
The Priority Information Alert Service allows the mobile users to receive 
mission related information while on the move.  The type of information that is 
served to the user includes tasking orders, situation reports and a host of local 
information for weather, traffic and critical news.   
 
3. Mapping Information Services 
The Mapping Information service provides street maps and terrain 
features for the area that the mobile users need to operate in. This allows the 
mobile users to access maps and terrain information using their mobile device 
like the PocketPC and WAP-based handhelds, while on the move.  2nd level 
information containing further description of the area is also available.   
Equipped with this capability, the mobile users can now find out the exact 
location of a building, the suggested path for him to expeditiously get there, and 
the locations of the nearest amenities and essential services. 
 
4. Mobile Reporting Module 
This module allows the mobile user to send structured reports of ground 
situation back to the Operations Coordinator in the Command Centre through 
their mobile device.  It also facilitates collaboration by providing the capability to  
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send unstructured instant messages to other team members, for real time 
exchange of critical information.    
 
5. Infrastructure for Mobile Communication      
In an emergency situation, the communication infrastructure would expect 
a surge in workload.  In order to be more equipped in dealing with a variety of 
asymmetric threats, it may be necessary to have a dedicated communication 
infrastructure.  Thus, it is worth exploring the possibility of setting up a separate 
Metropolitan Area Network (MAN) within an urban city, to serve the needs of law 
enforcement officers, ad-hoc task force and first responders including firemen 
and rescue workers.  Such a network can help ensure persistency in 
connectivity, with seamless and automatic switching between disparate 
networks.  Therefore, even at the peak of a crisis, the mobile teams can continue 
to receive tasking orders and situation reports from the Command Centre.  They 
can continue sending timely ground situation reports and communicate with their 










An example of a wireless Metropolitan Area Network is shown in Figure 
12.  
 
Figure 12.   Example of Wireless Metropolitan Area Network. [Cisco] 
 
A series of WLAN routers is mounted in prominent places within the city, 
including lamp post along the road, top of buildings and bridges. This series of 
routers and access points will form the Metropolitan Area Network.  A mobile 
user whose device is within the range of the wireless access point will have the 
network automatically initiate a session to exchange information. If the user 
leaves the network in the middle of the session, into an area with restricted or no 
communications bandwidth, the point of interruption is recorded so that the 
remaining data can be delivered in the next instance when the mobile user is 







In this chapter, an architecture was proposed to ensure that a network of 
distributed organization components comprising of fixed and mobile elements 
can interoperate by exchanging information and coordinate activities in a flexible 
and scaleable manner.  The architecture amalgamates a set of software and 
information services and focus on three critical areas, namely: Data 

















VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis takes a retrospective view of the SARS incident in Singapore 
and discusses how Network Centric Operation concepts can be applied to deal 
with such a disease outbreak and similar kinds of biological asymmetric threats. 
Hitherto, discussions on the applications of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) have 
been skewed towards the needs of the military and build on the assumptions of 
the military. Employing the NCW framework to deal with an unconventional crisis 
brought on by an asymmetric threat that requires close coordination between 
multiple agencies including many non-military organizations to deal with it 
revealed several unique insights.  
In general, this category of asymmetric threats can be characterized by 
events that are out of the ordinary with no precedence, having many complex 
and evolving problems emerging in a time critical and rapidly deteriorating 
environment.  There can be many new and unknown factors involved, and the 
relationships among them are unclear.   
The key NCW lessons learnt from the Singapore’s SARS incident include: 
• The importance of information sharing.  
• The need to setup and work with an ad-hoc and flexible organizational 
structure.  
• The need for interoperability of inter-agency processes 
• The need to support mobility and agility 
• The need for pragmatic employment of technology 
Three main technological areas have been identified to be crucial in 
ensuring that seamless interoperability amongst the various agencies can be 
achieved.  These are data interoperability, support for ad-hoc organization and 
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mobile computing.  Subsequently, a technical architecture that amalgamates a 
set of software and information services that encompasses the three identified 
areas was proposed.   This architecture enables seamless sharing of information 
from heterogeneous sources and organizations.  It also enhances the 
interoperability of the ad-hoc multi-agency teams.   The architecture can help to 
facilitate decision making and ensure that timely response can be executed in the 
combat of the asymmetric threat.  The architecture is designed serve the needs 
of the four classes of users that was identified in the thesis.   They include the 
strategic decision makers, the operations coordinator, the mobile enforcers and 
the content managers.  It is recommended that the software solutions within the 
three different parts of the architecture be developed in parallel and verification 
exercises be setup to demonstrate how the various sub-modules can work 
together to deal with asymmetric threats.  
 
B. ENHANCEMENTS TO THE TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE 
 
There are several other potentially high payoff areas that have been 
identified and should be further explored.  These include:   
 
1. Service Oriented Architecture 
One of the solutions to support data interoperability for the current 
proposed architecture is to setup a common data repository that standardizes the 
information required and available for the various missions in the combat of 
unconventional asymmetric threats.   XML is the standard format used to support 
all storage and transmission of the required information. The current setup can 
be further enhanced into service oriented architecture by converting the set of 
proposed solutions into web services.  This can help to explore and demonstrate 
the viability of implementing a large scale service oriented architecture that 
supports disparate group of users from multiple agencies. The effort can also 
help to explore the possibility of handling real-time and non-real-time 
requirements together using a service oriented architecture.  The most notable 
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contribution from this effort will be the ability to demonstrate seamless access to 
multiple data sources and applications from a ubiquitous web based interface.  
 
2. Security Services  
This enhancement involves a review of the security requirements and a 
study of the security policies, controls, tools and mechanisms required to support 
a multi-agency ad-hoc task force. There are different technologies, system and 
platforms involved.  The objective is to ensure that all users of the services and 
software tools on the architecture can be appropriately authenticated and 
accounted.  It also ensures that all information can be securely stored and 
communicated by designing security solutions to protect the information from 
unauthorized disclosure, modification, interference and destruction.  The required 
security services for both the desktop and the mobile users can be subsequently 
developed and incorporated into the architecture.   
 
3. Information Exploitation Services  
Implementing the current architecture helps to ensure that data 
interoperability can be achieved and seamless cross agency access to data is 
enabled.  This provides the ability to share information and attain a common level 
of situation awareness.  The next important milestone would be to explore 
techniques and tools that can enhance the exploitation of the vast amounts of 
information available. This can help the users search and navigate through large 
volumes of data sources and perform text mining to discover patterns, unveil 
hidden relationships, cluster related information and create linkages between 
disparate pieces of information and transform them into useful knowledge that 
can be appropriately tagged and stored.  This area of work also includes finding 
the most optimal strategy to extract, represent, store, exploit and present the 
different types of information available including Abstract Information, Executive 
Information and Specific Information. There may be other effective solutions for 
capturing  and  representing  the  tacit  knowledge  residing  in  the  minds of the  
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decision makers, which will be extremely useful if it can be extracted, 
represented and stored into knowledge bases for sharing, query and further 
analysis. 
 
4. Information Presentation Services   
With seamless access to the vast amount of information from the large 
network of data sources, information presentation and navigation becomes a key 
capability in the management of content overload and ensure that the information 
are being presented within the context of the user.  This area of work shall 
explore effective techniques for information presentation and navigation which 
could include the use of animation, audio and video means, suitable highlights 
and alarms, multiple integrated views of the information and content summary in 
an attempt to find the most optimal way of presenting information according to 
the task, the need and the capability of the computing device.   
Another important area of work is to explore new ways of presenting 
information on small handheld device like personal digital assistance (PDAs) and 
possibly 3G cellular phones, when used in a rapidly changing and time critical 
environment that characterize the combat against an asymmetric threat. 
Handheld devices also help team members maintain situation awareness and 
facilitate decision making while on the move  These devices have other unique 
characteristics in terms of computation power, networking capabilities, display 
size and battery life, that further constraint the type of solutions that can be 
developed.  Thus, there is a need to investigate the most optimal way to present 
alerts and updates and to enable collaboration among team members. 
 
5. Mobile Computing Services  
This study shall involve further explorations of the mobile computing 
services that will be useful in enabling decision making on the move and 
ensuring timely and precise response for the mobile enforcers.   Extending 
beyond the scope of the SARS incident in Singapore, to be truly mobile and able 
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to support the deployment of an ad-hoc task force to any place at any time, there 
is a need to explore other options of providing the infrastructure required for 
mobile communication and implement an equivalent of a Metropolitan Network 
using mobile infrastructure.  In terms of information management and decision 
support, there is a need to explore the various techniques for information 
presentation, delivery and synchronization for mobile users by taking into 
consideration the capability of the mobile devices that the end user carry, and the 
various physical and ergonomics factor associated with the mobile device.  There 
is also a need to explore strategies to provide reliable access to information while 
on the move.    
 
 C. EXPLORATION ON COGNITIVE SERVICES  
 
Cognitive services can help Decision Makers analyze data, assess various 
hypotheses, consider alternatives and make decisions.   The objective of the 
study is to explore the following cognitive tools and assess its usefulness in the 
combat of asymmetric threats:   
 
1. Analysis Tools  
This set of tools allows the user to integrate and correlate information from 
different sources and perform time, space and activity analysis.  Performing time 
analysis allows the user to understand the critical path and timeline of the various 
events.  Performing space analysis allows users to explore and better 
understand location-centric events.  Performing activity analysis allows the users 
to gain insights of critical processes associated with the asymmetric threat in the 
given time and space.  All the tools can work together and help the users gain a 
better understanding of the complex relationship among activities and events that 




2. Hypothesis Tools  
The hypothesis tool allows the users to map out all the possible causes of 
action or hypotheses, for the event associated with the existing asymmetric 
threat that is being dealt with.  Subsequently, incoming data and evidence 
collected can help to substantiate or eliminate some of the hypotheses.  It also 
allows users to compare and evaluate the alternative causes of actions.  
 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOCIAL NETWORKS 
 
The success of Network Centric Operations is not just dependent on 
technology and process.  The most significant contribution and impact will come 
from the people involved.  Thus, there is a need to explore and gain a better 
understanding of how social networks and organization dynamics can influence 
the success of Network Centric Operations. By investigating on the desired set of 
behavioral traits and organization structure, we will have the right setup and be 
more equipped to leverage on social networks to reinforce the capability of the 
Network Centric Operations. 
Beside formal structures, research could include how informal networks 
within groups of people determine the performance of the groups.  Research in 
this area could include how such informal networks are formed; why and how a 
person associates with such informal networks; how individuals behaves within 
such informal networks and how such behaviors affect the outcome of the 
network. 
Studies into the contributions of formal structures and informal networks 
toward the objective of the group could be carried out.  Such studies will help 
determine the positive and negative effects of these networks; how one can 
design formal structures and facilitate the formation of informal networks that will 
compliment rather than negate each other. 
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With this analysis, we will have a better understanding of how 
collaborations happen within networks.  This will help the formulation of tools and 
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